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The social power of algorithms 
 
 
David Beer 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This article explores the questions associated with what might be thought of as the social 
power of algorithms. The article, which introduces a special issue on the same topic, begins 
by reflecting on how we might approach algorithms from a social scientific perspective. The 
article is then split into two sections. The first deals with the issues that might be associated 
with an analysis of the power of the algorithms themselves. This section outlines a series of 
issues associated with the functionality of the algorithms and how these functions are 
powerfully deployed within social world. The second section then focuses upon the notion of 
the algorithm. In this section the article argues that we need to look beyond the algorithms 
themselves, as a technical and material presence, to explore how the notion or concept of 
the algorithm is also an important feature of their potential power. In this section it is 
suggested that we look at the way that notions of the algorithm are evoked as a part of 
broader rationalities and ways of seeing the world. Exploring the notion of the algorithm may 
enable us to see how algorithms also play a part in social ordering processes, both in terms 
of how the algorithm is used to promote certain visions of calculative objectivity and also in 
relation to the wider governmentalities that this concept might be used to open-up. 
  
  
The social power of algorithms 
 
The recent Amazon Prime drama Casual (2016) introduced the viewer to Alex, a disenchanted 
internet entrepreneur who obsesses over his algorithm. ůĞǆ ?ƐĂůŐŽƌŝƚŚŵ, we discover, is the 
key to the significant success of his online dating company Snooger. He already lives an 
apparently limitless if unfulfilling life of decadence and luxury. Yet he keeps tweaking and 
playing with the algorithm, trying to perfect it, trying to hone and refine its powers. Alex, it 
would seem, wants the algorithm to perfectly match couples and to predict successful 
partnerships  W including for himself. With a nagging need to hone, he keeps fiddling and 
working at the algorithm to try to perfect the outcomes. He knows how to play the algorithm 
to his advantage, as do other users of the site. They know what combination of profile 
features will produce lots of matches, but Alex wants the algorithm to match profiles in ways 
ƚŚĂƚ ĐĂŶ ?ƚ ďĞ ƉůĂǇĞĚ ? tŚĞŶ ǁĞ ƌĞƚƵƌŶ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƐĞĐŽŶĚƐĞĂƐŽŶ of Casual ? ǁĞ ĨŝŶĚ ůĞǆ ?ƐĐŽ-
directed company is now in trouble. The problem, we discover from the venture capitalists 
who wish to purchase the company, is that the algorithm is just too good. Its predictions are 
too precise. As a result, people are finding long term matches and no longer need the site. 
The answer  W to make the algorithm less predictive.  
 
In Casual ?Ɛmise-en-scène we have the algorithm as a kind of intermittent, shadowy and 
ƉŽǁĞƌĨƵů ĨŽƌĐĞ ? ĚƌĂǁŝŶŐ ůĞǆ ?Ɛ ƉƵƌƐƵŝƚ ŽĨ ƉĞƌĨĞĐƚŝŽŶ ďƵƚ ĂůƐŽ ĂĐƚŝǀĞ ŝŶ ƐŚĂƉŝŶŐ ƐŽĐŝĂů
connections and relations. A little like their presence in the social world, the algorithm is a 
part of the background or setting (see for instance Parisi, 2013: 26-36). Casual reproduces the 
sense that algorithms are a powerful if largely unnoticed social presence. But we should 
hesitate. This is obviously an imagined sense of the power of algorithms, it is a vision in which 
an investment in coding can lead to uncanny and irresistible predictive powers of deduction. 
This example presents two things to consider. The first is that it provides an illustration of the 
type of embedded nature of algorithms and their potential role in social processes  (amongst 
a range of examples see for instance Kitchin & Dodge, 2011: or Manovich, 2013). I would add 
though that it is a very particular notion of how these algorithms work and the type of role 
that they play. More importantly though, for the purpose of the arguments I wish to develop 
towards the end of this article, the TV show Casual is just one illustrative example of the way 
in which we have come to imagine the power of the algorithm today. That is to say that when 
thinking about the power of the algorithm, we need to think not just about the impact and 
consequences of code, we also need to think about the powerful ways in which notions and 
ideas about the algorithm circulate through the social world. Within these notions of the 
algorithm we are likely to find broader rationalities, knowledge-making and norms  W with the 
concept of the algorithm holding powerful and convincing sway in how things are done or 
how they should be done. 
 
This takes us to the doors of a very famous garage. In 1998, working out of the inauspicious 
surroundings of their Menlo Park garage, Larry Page and Sergey Brin developed the well-know 
PageRank algorithm that drives Google Search results. The power of this algorithm, John 
MacCormick (2012: 25) has explained, is in its ability to  ‘ĨŝŶĚŶĞĞĚůĞƐŝŶŚĂǇƐƚĂĐŬƐ ? ?dŚŝƐƉŽǁĞƌ ?
as we know, is in the ability to sort and prioritise the media we encounter. Through its use of 
ŵŽĚĞůƐŽĨ ‘ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ?ƚŚŝƐĂůŐŽƌŝƚŚŵŝƐĂďůĞƚŽ use markers to assess importance in relation to 
the chosen search terms (see MacCormick, 2012: 36). As algorithms go, the PageRank 
algorithm is unusual in its fame (for a discussion see both Gillespie and WillƐŽŶ ?ƐƉŝĞĐĞƐŝŶƚŚŝƐ
volume) ? /ƚŝƐŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŵŽƌĞ ǀŝƐŝďůĞƐƉŝŬĞƐŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞ  ‘ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂůƵŶĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐ ? (Thrift, 
2006: 224) is momentarily pierced by the fame of one of the component parts of a complex 
media assemblage. As such, the PageRank algorithm is certainly atypical. /ƚ ?ƐĂŶĂůŐŽƌŝƚŚŵǁĞ
know something about, allowing us the opportunity to reflect on its ability to shape our 
knowledge and to produce outcomes  ?ƐĞĞŝůŝđ ? ? ? ? ? ?. It is far more common for algorithmic 
processes to pass us by without being noticed. Once we begin to reflect on the scale of these 
processes  W with algorithms, sorting, filtering, searching, prioritising, recommending, deciding 
and so on  W it is perhaps little wonder that a discussion of the social role of algorithms is 
picking up pace. There is a desire to try to understand how these algorithmic processes shape 
social and everyday life (see Willson, this volume). TŚĞƌĞ ŝƐĂĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽƐĞĞŚŽǁ ‘ĂůŐŽƌŝƚŚŵŝĐ
ĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ?  ?^ƚƌŝƉŚĂƐ ?  ? ? ? ? ?ŝƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĚĂŶĚŚŽǁ  ‘ĂůŐŽƌŝƚŚŵŝĐ ůŝĨĞ ? (Amoore & Piotukh, 2016) 
is lived. This is to be expected, not least because the density of technological assemblages 
continues to escalate and so too, it would seem, algorithmic processes take on increasing 
weight and responsibility. 
 
This suggests two preliminary problems. The first problem is understanding what an algorithm 
is. The second is understanding how different algorithms work. In other words, we will need 
description to assist in the pursuit of a more detailed understanding of what we might call the 
social power of algorothms. That is to say that there is a sense that we need to understand 
what algorithms are and what they do in order to fully grasp their influence and 
consequences. This is where we can hit blockages in our understandings. It is quite hard to be 
versed in social theory and in the technical minutiae of coding. It is not that this combination 
is impossible, but it is more likely to require collaborative work than being within the scope 
of the lone scholar. ŽŽŬƐƐƵĐŚĂƐ:ŽŚŶDĂĐŽƌŵŝĐŬ ?Ɛ (2012) 9 Algorithms That Changed The 
Future are useful for giving us a sense of the scale, but it is then hard to move toward the 
depth of what we are looking at  W the scale, variation and design principles of the many 
algorithmic forms still reside largely in Thrift ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ‘ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ƵŶĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐ ? ? Social 
scientists end up operating in one register and coders in another, with it being difficult to 
permeate the divide. There is plenty of work that is now uncovering the influence of particular 
algorithmic ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐ ? dĂŝŶĂ ƵĐŚĞƌ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ĞǆĞŵƉůĂƌǇ ǁŽƌŬ ŽŶ&ĂĐĞďŽŽŬ ?Ɛ ĚŐĞZĂŶŬ
algorithm is one such instance (and we can also point to the piece by Neyland and Möller in 
ƚŚŝƐǀŽůƵŵĞ ? ? ƵĐŚĞƌ ?Ɛwork reveals a great deal about the nature of the news feed on that 
popular social media platform and how it makes certain things visible to the individual user. 
Indeed, we are now seeing a growing interest in treating algorithms as objects of study (see 
for the example the collection edited by Ziewitz, 2016a). 
 
As this would suggest, perhaps the biggest single issue we have to consider when attempting 
to research the social power of algorithms is the potential difficulty of fully appreciating the 
object of study. Uncertainty about the algorithm could lead us to misjudge their power, to 
overemphasise their importance, to misconceive of the algorithm as a lone detached actor,  
or to miss how power might actually be deployed through such technologies. This difficulty 
of comprehension, amongst other things, has led Frank Pasquale (2015) to conclude that we 
ĂƌĞůŝǀŝŶŐŝŶĂ ‘black box society ?. This is a society, he suggests, that ŝƐƉŽƉƵůĂƚĞĚďǇ ‘ĞŶŝŐŵĂƚŝĐ
ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĞƐ ? ?WĂƐƋƵĂůĞ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ?. PasƋƵĂůĞ ?ƐĐĞŶƚƌĂůƉŽŝŶƚŝƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ǀĂůƵĞƐĂŶĚƉƌĞƌŽŐĂƚŝǀĞƐ
that the encoded rules enact ĂƌĞŚŝĚĚĞŶ ǁŝƚŚŝŶďůĂĐŬďŽǆĞƐ ? ?This matters, Pasquale (2015: 
8) claims, because  ‘ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ŝƐŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞĚĂůŐŽƌŝƚŚŵŝĐĂůůǇ ? ?Such a point opens up 
a series of questions about the role of algorithms in the deployment or expression of power. 
These questions would concern the nature of such an authority and whether an algorithm has 
the capability to express or enable authority. dŚĞĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶŝŶWĂƐƋƵĂůĞ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ŝƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶ
big data and algorithms, with algorithms giving those big data a purpose and direction. Thus 
the algorithm becomes the source of political concern, with the data being operationalised 
through those algorithmic decisions. ƐWĂƐƋƵĂůĞ  ? ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ƉƵƚƐ ŝƚ ?  ‘ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐĂƌĞ
ŵĂĚĞŶŽƚŽŶƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐŽĨƚŚĞĚĂƚĂƉĞƌƐĞ ?ďƵƚŽŶƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐŽĨĚĂƚĂĂŶĂůǇǌĞĚĂůŐŽƌŝƚŚŵŝĐĂůůǇ ? ?
Here we see the role of algorithms, as decision making parts of code (see Beer, 2013: 65), as 
being analytic and decisive (for a discussion of the role of algorithms in data analytics, see 
Kitchin, 2014: 100-12). Indeed, it is often this ability to take decisions without (or with little) 
human intervention that is at the heart of discussions about algorithms potential power. Of 
course, again, this creates questions about the role of agency and the like (see, for instance, 
Pasquale, 2015: 38), but there is clearly something here that should be of interest to anyone 
who wishes to understand the ordering of the social world, especially where software may be 
taking on some constitutive or performative role in ordering that world on our behalf.  
 
As this alludes, one key problem with attempting to explore the social power of algorithms is 
in how we approach those algorithms in the first place. Should we treat them as lines of code, 
as objects, or should we see them as social processes in which the social world is embodied 
in the substrate of the code? The problem comes if we try to detach the algorithm from the 
social world in order to analyse its properties and powers   W seeing it as a technical and self-
contained object that exists as a distinct presence is likely to be a mistake. Detaching the 
algorithm in order to ask what it does requires separating the algorithm from the social world 
in the first place and then to treat it as a separate entity to those social processes. Algorithms 
are inevitably modelled on visions of the social world, and with outcomes in mind, outcomes  
influenced by commercial or other interests and agendas (as discussed by Williamson, this 
volume). As well as being produced from a social context, the algorithms are lived with, they 
are an integral part of that social world, they are woven into practices and outcomes. And 
then we have the recursive processes as those outcomes are modelled back into algorithm 
design (see Parisi, 2013). As algorithms afford data circulations they can be tweaked and re-
coded where the outcomes are seen to be in need of adjustment (see for example the 
discussion in Kitchin & Dodge, 2011: 30; or in Gillespie, this volume). So, seeing the algorithm 
as a separate item of study outside of its social ecology is likely to be a mistake. Algorithms 
ƐŚŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚ ďĞ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚ ĂƐ ĂŶ ŽďũĞĐƚ ƚŚĂƚ ĞǆŝƐƚƐ ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞ ŽĨ ƚŚŽƐĞ ƐŽĐŝĂůƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐ  (as 
discussed in a range of places in this volume, especially in the contributions from Neyland and 
Möllers, Kitchin and Willson). Their existence and design is a product of social forces, as are 
their implementations and redesigns. 
 
To set the scene for thinking broadly about the material ways in which power may operate 
through the algorithm, I intend to briefly outline a series points that we might think of as 
representing the areas in which algorithms are in some way implicated, involved or integrated 
into social power dynamics (noting also that a detailed discussion of how to approach 
algorithms can be found in ZŽď <ŝƚĐŚŝŶ ?Ɛ contribution to this volume). Emerging from the 
articles gathered in this issue, the below section outlines a series of issues that might be 
associated with the functionality of algorithms and how these functions can be seen to be a 
part of the deployment of power in social ordering.  
 
Power and the algorithm 
 
Over the last ten years algorithms have become a fairly well established presence in social 
scientific work (as outlined by Kitchin, this volume; see also Ziewitz, 2016b). When we 
consider this work and the broader changes with which it is associated, we can begin to draw 
out some important analytical issues that we may wish to consider were we to be interested 
in understanding the social power of algorithms  W or social power operating through the 
algorithm.  A primary concern here might be the meshing of human and machine agency (see 
Mackenzie, 2006; Crang & Graham, 2007: 792; Beer, 2013: 63-101; Ziewitz, 2016b: 7). Such 
observations have recently been placed into broader debates about the status of agency as 
processes of  ‘datafication ? continue to expand and as data feeds-ďĂĐŬŝŶƚŽƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ ůŝǀĞƐŝŶ
different ways (Kennedy et al, 2015).  
 
We can link these broader issues to some specific questions that algorithms create for human 
discretion (see Berry, 2014; Amoore, 2013) or even link it to what Introna (2011: 122-130) has 
ĐĂůůĞĚƚŚĞ ‘ĞŶĐŽĚŝŶŐŽĨŚƵŵĂŶĂŐĞŶĐǇ ? ? Such a concern could well take us back beyond these 
interests in the algorithm, to the type of work done on cybernetics, interfaced bodies and 
posthumanism by Donna Haraway (1991), Katherine Hayles (1999) and William J. Mitchell  
(2003). But with the emergence of algorithmic systems in the everyday (see Willson, this 
volume), this interest has gained new momentum, especially where algorithms are seen to 
be taking decisions out of the hands of human actors or where discretion is eroded by 
algorithmic limitations to thought (see Berry, 2014: 11). This has led Kate Crawford (2016) to 
reflect on the politics of such agency and to ask whether it is possible for algorithms to be 
agonistic. The questions around agency are complex, but the notion of algorithmic power is 
often premised on the idea that algorithms carry some form of agentic power. The role of 
ĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶ ŝƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚŝŶĞŶtŝůůŝĂŵƐŽŶ ?ƐĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ƚŚŝƐĐŽůůĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ,ĞƚĂŬĞƐƉŽƉƵůĂƌ
visions oĨƚŚĞ ‘ƐŵĂƌƚĐŝƚǇ ?ĂŶĚĞǆƉůŽƌĞƐ ŚŽǁƚŚĞƐĞƚŚĞŶĨŝůƚĞƌŝŶƚŽƚŚĞ ‘ƐŵĂƌƚĞƌĐůĂƐƐƌŽŽŵ ?ĂŶĚ
 ‘ƐŵĂƌƚĞƌĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?This focus ĞŶĂďůĞƐtŝůůŝĂŵƐŽŶƚŽĞǆƉůŽƌĞŚŽǁƚŚĞ ‘ůĞĂƌŶŝŶŐďƌĂŝŶ ?ŝƐƐĞĞŶ
ƚŽ ŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ůĞĂƌŶŝŶŐĂůŐŽƌŝƚŚŵ ? ?His contribution explores how we have come to 
understand or represent such a set of interactions. This, as he puts it, is to explore how 
 ‘ŵĞŶƚĂů ůŝfe is understood algorithmically ?. This contribution provides us with a direct 
illustration of how we might explore the apparent meshing of human and machine agency, a 
theme that continues in relation to noƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ  ‘ĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚ ĂŐĞŶĐǇ ?ŝŶEeyland and MölleƌƐ ?
article. Of course, both Neyland and Möllers and Williamson ?Ɛ ďĂůĂŶĐĞĚ ĂŶĚ ƌĞǀĞĂůŝŶŐ
analyses illustrate how easy it might be to get carried away with ideas that algorithms take 
over decision making processes, instead they indicate that there is a much more complex 
interweaving of types of agency going on that needs careful and critical understanding (see 
also Amoore, 2013: Yeung, this volume)  W if indeed agency is even the right terminology for 
this. As Bolin and Schwartz (2015) have discussed elsewhere, algorithmic outcomes are often 
 ‘ƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚĞĚďĂĐŬ ?ŝŶƚŽ ‘ ‘ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ?ƐŽĐŝĂůƉĂƌĂŵĞƚĞƌƐ ? ?/Ŷďroad terms though, there is a sense 
of a need to explore how algorithms make choices or how they provide information that 
informs and shapes choice. And then, of course, we have the human agent(s) who designed 
the algorithm shaping how these processes play-out or how they model desired outcomes  
into those systems (see Mackenzie, 2006).  
 
Given that algorithms are seen to be the decision-making parts of code, it is perhaps little 
surprise then that there is an interest in understanding how algorithms shape organisation, 
institutional, commercial, and governmental decision making. The second issue, which, 
related to the above, might concern the role of algorithms in such decision making. This is to 
reflect on the role of algorithms in shaping how people are treated and judged. Or the way 
that algorithms shape outcomes and opportunities. This is to reflect on the way that 
algorithmic systems are built into organisational structures and to think about how they then 
shape decisions or become integrated into the choices that are made  W and how those choices 
then bĞĐŽŵĞ Ă ƉĂƌƚ ŽĨ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ ůŝǀĞƐ ? <ĂƌĞŶ zĞƵŶŐ ?Ɛ ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶ ĞǆƉůŽƌĞƐ ƚŚĞ ƌŽůĞ ŽĨ
algorithms in regulation and governance. Yeung looks at the part played by algorithms and 
ďŝŐĚĂƚĂŝŶ ‘ĚĞƐŝŐŶ-ďĂƐĞĚ ?ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?zĞƵŶŐĞǆƉůŽƌĞƐƚŚĞŝĚĞĂŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŚǇƉĞƌŶƵĚŐĞ ? ŝŶĞǆƉůŽƌŝŶŐ
how algorithms shape choice, with big data based nudges becoming a powerful presence in 
pre-empting behaviours. Elsewhere in this issue, Taina Bucher reflects on the other side of 
this process. As well as reflecting on the different ways that people think about algorithms, 
ƵĐŚĞƌĞǆƉůŽƌĞƐ ‘ŚŽǁĂůŐŽƌŝƚŚŵƐŵĂŬĞƉĞŽƉůĞĨĞĞů ?ďǇĨŽĐƵƐŝŶŐĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇŽŶƚŚĞ ‘ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚ
spaces where ƉĞŽƉůĞ ĂŶĚ ĂůŐŽƌŝƚŚŵƐ ŵĞĞƚ ?  WĨůĞƐŚŝŶŐŽƵƚ ƚŚĞ ĚĞƚĂŝůƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞƐĞ  ‘ƉĞƌƐŽŶĂů
ƐƚŽƌŝĞƐ ? ?ƐƐƵĐŚ ?ƵĐŚĞƌƉŝĞĐĞŝƐĂŶĞǆĂŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĞǀĞƌǇĚĂǇůŝǀĞĚĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐŽĨĂůŐŽƌŝƚŚŵƐ
and their affects. This is a perspective on the algorithm that is also endorsed by Michele 
tŝůůƐŽŶ ?ƐƉŝĞĐĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĨŽĐƵƐĞƐŽŶƚŚĞĞŵďĞĚĚĞĚ ŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨĂůŐŽƌŝƚŚŵƐĂƐƚŚĞǇĨƌĂŵĞĞǀĞƌǇĚĂǇ
life. Such a perspective is also discussed as a potential analytical angle in Rob Kitchin ?Ɛ
contribution. ^ŝŵŝůĂƌůǇ ?dĂƌůĞƚŽŶ'ŝůůĞƐƉŝĞ ?ƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞƐŚŽw responding to algorithmic 
processes can facilitate the bending of the outcomes to particular agendas. Thus, those who 
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĂůŐŽƌŝƚŚŵƐ ĂƌĞ ĂďůĞ ƚŽ ƌĞŶĚĞƌ ƚŚŝŶŐƐ  ‘ĂůŐŽƌŝƚŚŵŝĐĂůůǇ ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝǌĂďůĞ ? ? ĂƐ
Gillespie puts it in his contribution to this issue. Here we see how algorithms are understood 
and potentially manipulated, particularůǇĂƐǁĞƐĞĞŝŶ'ŝůůĞƐƉŝĞ ?Ɛ case study how the algorithm 
can be recoded to render certain things less visible.  Taken together, these pieces provide 
insights and a range of perspectives on how algorithms are deployed to shape decision-
making and behaviour, and then how these algorithmic processes are experienced and 
reacted to at the level of everyday experience. The articles here, when used in combination, 
afford the analysis of algorithms at a range of scales  W incorporating anything from 
multinational organisational structures to the individual body. We can bolster this multiscalar 
approach even further by looking at other resources, Cheney-Lippold (2011), for instance, has 
ĞǀĞŶǁƌŝƚƚĞŶŽĨƚŚĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůĨŽƌĂŶ ‘ĂůŐŽƌŝƚŚŵŝĐŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ ? to be formed. On this point of scale, 
ĞƌŶŚĂƌĚZŝĞĚĞƌ ?ƐƉŝĞĐĞŝŶƚŚŝƐĐŽůůĞĐƚŝŽŶĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚǁĞŵŝŐŚƚĞǆƉůŽƌĞƐŽŵĞ ‘ŵŝĚĚůĞŐƌŽƵŶĚ ?
that resides between the more conceptual theories of algorithms and their technical details. 
This, for Rieder, is a potentially rich analytical space that connects broader social 
understandings of algorithms with an understanding of their technical capacity and 
integration. 
 
This brings us to the third set of issues which might be understood as the politics of 
algorithmic sorting, ordering and prediction. This would include the capacity of the algorithm 
to create, maintain or cement norms and notions of abnormality (see Crandall , 2010: 83). 
Here we might wonder how algorithms shape what is encountered, or how algorithms 
prioritise and make visible. This is to explore how the predictions of algorithmic systems feed 
ŝŶƚŽƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ ůŝǀĞƐ ?ƐŚĂƉŝŶŐǁŚĂƚƚŚĞǇŬŶŽǁ ? ǁŚŽ ƚŚĞǇŬŶŽǁ ? ǁŚĂƚ ƚŚĞǇĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌ ?ĂŶĚǁŚĂƚ
they experience. The power of algorithms here is in their ability to make choices , to classify, 
to sort, to order and to rank. That is, to decide what matters and to decide what should be 
most visible. Again the search result is one example, but so too is the social media news feed 
or the  ‘ǁŚŝůĞǇŽƵǁĞƌĞĂǁĂǇ ?ůŝƐƚŽĨdǁĞĞƚƐĂŶĚƐŽŽŶ ? ŐĂŝŶ ?ZŝĞĚĞƌ ?ƐƉŝĞĐĞŵĂŬĞƐĂƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ
intervention in understanding such classification processes. Rieder reminds us that these 
ĂůŐŽƌŝƚŚŵŝĐƐǇƐƚĞŵƐĂŶĚ ?ĂƐŚĞƉƵƚƐŝƚ ? ‘ĂůŐŽƌŝƚŚŵŝĐƚĞĐŚŶŝƋƵĞƐ ? ?ĚŽŶŽƚĐŽŵĞĨƌŽŵŶŽǁŚĞƌĞ ?
but are built upon existing classification means, ideas and categories. ƐƚƌŝĚDĂŐĞƌ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?
work on how capitalist ideologies are embedded in search engine processes is instructive here 
of how broader power structures might find their ways into algorithmic processes  and 
designs. Similarly, ZŽď<ŝƚĐŚŝŶ ?ƐƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĂƚŝĐ ŽǀĞƌǀŝĞǁŽĨ the various approaches we might 
take to exploring algorithms picks up on this, with his emphasis upon the performative role 
of algorithms. Kitchin proposes that we expose how algorithms are constructed, how they 
work, and the performative part they then play in the world. His piece provides six 
methodological approaches for exploring this and for overcoming the difficulty of 
appreciating the performative role of algorithms in ordering processes. Grasping such 
performativity is placed alongside the problems of gaining access and managing the 
heterogeneous forms that algorithms take ŝŶ<ŝƚĐŚŝŶ ?ƐƉŝĞĐĞ. In relation to the above point, 
we also, of course, have the algorithmic sealing of life, or what has been referred to in 
WĂƌŝƐĞƌ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?ƉŽƉƵůĂƌǁŽƌŬ ĂƐ ‘ĨŝůƚĞƌďƵďďůĞƐ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚďǇďŽƚŚzĞƵŶŐĂŶĚZŝĞĚĞƌ 
in this volume). This line or argument suggests that algorithmic sorting processes are likely to 
sort cultural experiences and social connections to those.  This concerns the way that 
algorithms might narrow-down or close off external influences, leaving people continually 
exposed to the same types of people, experiences, news, culture and so on. When thinking 
of how algorithms classify and order, we must, it is suggested, think of the way that algorithms 
repeat patterns and thus close down interactions to those that fit existing patterns. Extending 
these issues around ordering, Daniel Neyland and Norma Möllers use their piece to 
problematize the very notion of algorithmic power. They use a focus on the sorting and 
ordering dynamics of algorithms to open up questions about the difficulties of thinking of 
algorithms as holding some sort of power. They note that when attempting to understand 
ƉŽǁĞƌ ŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽĂůŐŽƌŝƚŚŵƐ ?ǁĞŶĞĞĚƚŽƐĞĞƚŚŝƐƉŽǁĞƌ ĂƐĂŶ  ‘ĞĨĨĞĐƚĂŶĚŶŽƚ ĂĐĂƵƐĞŽĨ
ĞǀĞŶƚƐ ? (which returns us agĂŝŶƚŽzĞƵŶŐ ?ƐǀŝƚĂůĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ‘ŚǇƉĞƌŶƵĚŐĞ ? ?. That 
is to say that power is realised in the outcomes of algorithmic processes. Therefore these 
processes ƐƵĐŚĂƐĂůŐŽƌŝƚŚŵŝĐ  ‘/Ĩ ?dŚĞŶ ?ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐ ?need careful attention. Their key point is 
that we need to see algorithms as being deeply relational and being a product of a set of 
associations. For Neyland and Möllers, tŚĞĂůŐŽƌŝƚŚŵƐĂƌĞ  ‘ƚŝĞĚƚŽ ? ǀĂƌŝŽƵƐĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚ
situations in which they operate, rather than being entities in their own right. So, to 
understand the sorting power of algorithms, for instance, we need to understand the 
associations, dependencies and relations that facilitate those algorithmic processes and their 
outcomes  W rather than seeing the algorithm as carrying social power.  
 
All of this is by no means a fully populated list of all of the ways the algorithms might be seen 
to have some sort of social power (for more detail see the various papers in this collection or 
the overview provided by Kitchin in this volume). Rather this is a cursory list of just a few of 
the most prominent issues as the functionality and performance of algorithms are considered 
alongside their social roles, implications and consequences. These points link directly and 
indirectly to a number of the themes that emerge from this special issue. But the articles 
gathered in this volume are bursting with ideas and possibilities  that stretch far beyond the 
cursory outline that I have provided. / ?ǀĞŽŶůǇƌĞĂůůǇƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚ ĂǁŚŝƐƚůĞ-stop tour of these far 
reaching issues here.  
 
The power of the notion of the algorithm 
 
The previous section dealt with the issues that might be associated with an analysis of the 
power of the algorithms themselves. Before concluding, and to open up some further 
possibilities, this section focuses more directly upon the power of the notion of the algorithm. 
We need to look beyond the algorithms themselves to explore how the concept of the 
algorithm is also an important feature of their potential power. This is to suggest that we look 
at the way that notions of the algorithm are evoked as a part of broader rationalities and ways 
of seeing the world. The questions here would revolve around how the algorithm is 
envisioned to promote certain values and forms of calculative objectivity.  
 
We can begin by linking this back to the previous section to argue that one way in which the 
power of algorithms might be explored is in relation to the production of truth. For Foucault, 
in the mid-1970s at least, the production of truth was placed centrally in understandings of 
the operation of power (see Foucault, 2004 & 2014). Foucault (2004: 24) used a focus on truth 
to explore what he describes as the  ‘ŚŽǁ ?ŽĨƉŽǁĞƌ. In his 1976 lecture series Society Must Be 
Defended, he connects this interest in truth with his earlier interest in the connections 
between power and knowledge. In a lecture from the 14th of January 1976, Foucault (2004: 
24), reflecting on his approach to power in the previous years, argues that: 
 ‘ŵƵůƚŝƉůĞ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ ƉŽǁĞƌ ƚƌĂǀĞƌƐĞ ? ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝǌĞ ? ĂŶĚ ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞ ƚŚĞ ƐŽĐŝĂůďŽĚǇ ?
they are indissociable from a discourse of truth, and they can neither be established 
nor function unless a true discourse is produced, accumulated, put into circulation, 
and set to work. Power cannot be exercised unless a certain economy of discourses of 
ƚƌƵƚŚ ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐŝŶ ?ŽŶƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐŽĨ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂŶŬƐƚŽ ?ƚŚĂƚƉŽǁĞƌ ? 
Foucault, of course, could not have directly accounted for the power of these active 
algorithmic systems or how discourses might feed into algorithmic coding or be shaped by 
ƚŚĞŝƌŽƵƚƉƵƚƐ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĂƚƚŚŝƐƉŽŝŶƚ ?ƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞƌŽůĞŽĨƚƌƵƚŚ ŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ŚŽǁ ?ŽĨƉŽǁĞƌ ?ǁĞ
might begin to reflect on how algorithms have the capacity to produce truths in two specific 
ways. First through the material interventions that algorithms make. These are those things 
discussed above, as well as many other ways in which algorithms produce outcomes that 
become or reflect wider notions of truth. Power then is operationalised through the 
algorithm, in that the algorithmic output cements, maintains or produces certain truths. From 
this perspective,  algorithms might be understood to create truths around things like riskiness, 
taste, choice, lifestyle, health and so on. The search for truth become then conflated with the 
perfect algorithmic design  W which is to say the search for an algorithm that is seen to make 
the perfect material intervention. There is a truth to which the algorithm might adhere or a 
truth that its actions might produce. This first category is reflected in the above discussion 
and would be concerned with tracking the power plays of the algorithms themselves. Second, 
ǁŚŝĐŚůĞĂĚƐŝŶƚŽ ƚŚĞƉŽŝŶƚ / ?Ě ůŝŬĞƚŽĚĞĚŝĐĂƚĞƚŚĞ remainder of this article to, we have the 
discursive interventions concerning algorithms. This is the type of truth making which is closer 
to that being proposed by Foucault. This is to do with the way that the term or notion of the 
algorithm is used, how it is framed and the type of truths that is wrapped up in. That is to say 
that algorithms are also a notional presence in discourse. We might look at how that term or 
notion is deployed to create or perpetuate certain truths  about social orders and the like, or 
how certain truths are cultivated through discussions or evocations of the algorithm. This 
would be to suggest that the notion of the algorithm is itself doing some work in these 
discursive framings. It is a notion that carries some persuasive weight and is likely to be 
suggestive of wider power claims and rationalities. My cursory argument here, in this opening 
piece, is that the study of algorithms would be enriched even further were we to explore both 
these material and discursive interventions and the ways in which they combine to afford 
social power through the production and maintenance of certain truths. 
 
tĞĐĂŶƚƵƌŶ ƚŽƐŽŵĞŽĨ&ŽƵĐĂƵůƚ ?ƐŽƚŚĞƌ ǁŽƌŬ ƚŽ ƚƌǇƚŽĐůĂƌŝĨǇǁŚĂƚ ŝƐŵĞĂŶƚŚĞƌĞĂŶĚŚŽǁ
power might operate through a notion or concept of the algorithm. For instance, Foucault 
(1991: 60) also claims: 
 ‘/ĚŽ ŶŽƚ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞƐĂďŽƵƚ ƚŚĞŝƌƐŝůĞŶƚůǇŝŶƚĞŶĚĞĚ ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐƐ ?ďƵƚ ĂďŽƵƚ ƚŚĞ
fact and the conditions of their manifest appearance; not about the contents which 
they may conceal, but about the transformations which they have effected; not about 
the sense preserved within them like a perpetual origin, but about the field where 
they co-exist, reside and disappear. It is a question of the analysis of the discourses in 
the dimension of their extĞƌŝŽƌŝƚǇ ? ? 
/ŶƚŚŝƐƉĂƐƐĂŐĞǁĞƐĞĞ&ŽƵĐĂƵůƚ ?Ɛ ĨŽĐƵƐ ŝƐŶŽƚ ƵƉŽŶ the connotations of discourse as such, 
rather it is upon the conditions that afford that discourse, the transformations that the 
discourses afford and the potential for using such discursive framings to open up the fields in 
which they are deployed. This is helpful at least in beginning to see how we might be 
interested in the very concept or notion of the algorithm and the way that the discourse 
framing their material presences may themselves afford transformations, shape fields and 
reveal something of the conditions through which that discourse is elaborated. Elsewhere 
Foucault also claims that his approach aims  ‘ƚŽ ĂŶĂůǇƐĞƚŚĞ ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞƐƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ?ƚŚĂƚ ŝƐ ?
these discursive practices that are intermediary between words and things: these discursive 
practices starting from which one can define what are the things and mark out the usage of 
ƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ ?  ?&ŽƵĐĂƵůƚ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ?). Again, we are only begging to sketch out such an approach to 
algorithms, but this suggests an angle from which we might explore the relations and 
potential disconnects located in the discursive practices residing and intermediating between 
the algorithm as a thing and the algorithm as a word.  
 
In a tentative mode, / ?Ě ůŝŬĞƚŽsuggest that the term or notion of the algorithm should also 
be considered when attempting to understand the social power of algorithms .  In some ways 
this power can potentially be detached from its technical and material form whilst still 
capturing something of the exteriority. As such we would need to understand algorithms 
within their discursive practices and framings. The notion of the algorithm is evoked to 
influence and convince, to suggest things and to envision a certain approach, governmentality 
and way of ordering. Plus, the term is also part of wider rationalities and ways of thinking. 
Together then, this requires us to explore and illustrate the power of this term whilst also 
potentially using it as a focal point for opening-up or revealing these wider rationalities. The 
notion of the algorithm is part of a wider vocabulary, a vocabulary that we might see deployed 
to promote a certain rationality, a rationality based upon the virtues of calculation, 
competition, efficiency, objectivity and the need to be strategic. As such, the notion of the 
algorithm can be powerful in shaping decisions, influencing behaviour and ushering in certain 
approaches and ideals. dŚĞĂůŐŽƌŝƚŚŵ ?ƐƉŽǁĞƌŵĂǇƚŚĞŶ ŶŽƚ ũƵƐƚďĞŝŶƚŚĞĐŽĚĞ ?ďƵƚ ŝŶƚŚĂƚ
way that it becomes part of a discursive understanding of desirability and efficiency in which 
the mention of algorithms is part of  ‘ĂĐŽĚĞŽĨŶŽƌŵĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?&ŽƵĐĂƵůƚ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?. The notion 
of the algorithm is part of the social power we should be exploring. The term algorithm carries 
something of this authority. Algorithms are, largely, trusted for their precision and objectivity. 
A certain rationality may well then be built into this perception of the algorithm. The discourse 
surrounding the algorithm might well reveal something of the wider political dynamics of 
which they are a part.  
 
With this in mind, we might open up this dimension of the social power of algorithms. This 
would require us to reveal the life of the concept and how it circulates. It would require us to 
reveal the powers that are attached to or associated with the algorithm, these are promises 
and ideals that are then projected onto the code itself. The aim would be to reveal the type 
of trust placed in systems that are labelled algorithmic (i.e. the idea that these are neutral 
and trustworthy systems working beyond human capacity). And, finally, to reveal the way 
that algorithmic visions are then responsible for the expansion and integration of algorithmic 
systems. The way that those systems are spoken about is part of how they are incorporated 
into social and organisational structures and a part of how their implicit logic spreads. Notions 
of the algorithm might, for instance, to link this to the work of Karin Knorr Cetina (1994: 5), 
become part of the fictions upon which organisation run.    
 
We have then a two pronged means for approaching the social power of algorithms emerging 
from this. In this regard Foucault (2004: 34) made the following pertinent point: 
 ‘/ƚ ŝƐƚŚĞĂĐƚƵĂůinstruments that form and accumulate knowledge, the observational 
methods, the recording techniques, the investigative research procedures, the 
verification mechanisms. That is, the delicate mechanisms of power cannot function 
unless knowledge, or rather knowledge apparatuses, are formed, organized, and put 
into cŝƌĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?  
This would suggest that we need to think in terms of algorithms as part of this knowledge 
apparatus through which power is enacted. Yet, at the same time there are linkages between 
 ‘ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐĂŶĚŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚ ?ŝƚ is ĐůĂŝŵĞĚ ?  ‘ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŚĂƐĂŶƵŶĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐ
ƚŚĂƚŚĂƐŝƚƐŽǁŶƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĨŽƌŵƐĂŶĚƌƵůĞƐ ? ?&ŽƵĐĂƵůƚ ?  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ? ?tŝƚŚƚŚŝƐŝŶŵŝŶĚ ? we might 
also see the very notion of the algorithm as being a part of that knowledge apparatus as well. 
Especially as it is used to justify the expansion and integration of that technical apparatus by 
promoting the need for calculation and forms of knowledge based governance.  
 
There is obviously a good deal more to be said here, for ƚŚĞŵŽŵĞŶƚ / ?ĚůŝŬĞƚŽƐŝŵƉůǇƐƵŐŐĞƐƚ
that the algorithm exists not just in code but it also exists in the social consciousness as a 
concept or term that is frequently used to stand for something (something that is not 
necessarily that code itself).  To understand the social power of algorithms is to understand 
the power of algorithms as code whilst also attempting to understand how notions of the 
algorithm move out into the world, how they are framed by the discourse and what they are 
said to be able to achieve.  &ŽƵĐĂƵůƚ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?ƉŽŝŶƚŝƐƚŚĂƚ ‘Ɖower constantly asks questions 
and questions us; it constantly investigates and records; it institutionalizes the search for 
ƚƌƵƚŚ ? ƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůŝǌĞƐŝƚ ?ĂŶĚƌĞǁĂƌĚƐ ŝƚ ? ?WĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĂƚ ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞsearch for truth 
is based upon the notions of these systems and their capacities along with the capillaries of 
these apparatuses and how discursive framings of their power are evoked to usher them in. 
 
Concluding thoughts 
 
In terms of future work on the social power of algorithms, we would of course point to the 
need for us to continue to look inside the black box  W or inside the algorithmic workings of 
ƚŚĞ  ‘ďůĂĐŬďŽǆƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ? ?WĂƐƋƵĂůĞ ? ? ? ? ? ?. As has been argued before (see Graham, 2004), we 
need to look inside these systems. This will require us to understand the technicalities of the 
systems as well as their social ordering potentials. We will need to understand the code, but 
we will also need to examine the work that is done by those modelling and coding these 
various types of algorithms. This would need to be accompanied by studies of how those 
algorithms play out in practice, watching how these algorithms mesh into organisations, 
routines, decision-making and so on. These would require us to analyse the materiality of the 
algorithms and the systems of which they are a part, to understand the work of coders, to see 
modelling processes in action, to understand how the algorithms then become part of 
everyday practices, to see the decisions made and to then see how people respond to those 
algorithmic processes. As I have outlined in this introduction, some of this work is well under 
way. / ?Ě ůŝŬĞ ƚŽ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƚŚĂƚ ǁĞ ĂůƐŽĚĞǀĞůŽƉ ĂŶ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ŝŶ ĂůŐŽƌŝƚŚŵƐ ƚŚĂƚ ĞǆƉůŽƌĞƐ ƚŚĞ
discourse surrounding algorithmic processes. This would be to examine the way that 
algorithms are a part of broader rationalities, broader programmes of social change and 
development. This is to think about the notion of an algorithm as also being a part of power 
dynamics. This, I have suggested, can be thought of in terms of the two ways in which 
algorithmic power works by producing truths  W both as outcomes or outputs of systems and 
as part of the discursive reinforcement of particular norms, approaches and modes of 
reasoning. 
 
The notion of the  ‘ĂůŐŽƌŝƚŚŵ ? is now taking on its own force, as a kind of evocative shorthand 
for the power and potential of calculative systems that can think more quickly, more 
comprehensively and more accurately than humans. As well as understanding the integration 
of algorithms, we need to understand the way that this term is incorporated into 
organisational, institutional and everyday understandings. The discourse surrounding 
algorithms may then provide a focal point for analysing broader political rationalities and 
modes of governance. In this  stream of work, the interest might not be in understanding the 
social powers of the technical systems, but in understanding how the notion of the algorithm 
itself has a kind of social power. The algorithm is now a cultural presence, perhaps even an 
iconic cultural presence, not just because of what they can do but also because of what the 
notion of the algorithm is used to project. This means though that the algorithm can be part 
of the deployment of power, not just in terms of its function but also in terms of how it is 
understood as a phenomenon. Algorithmic decisions are depicted as neutral decisions, 
algorithmic decisions are understood to be efficient decisions, algorithmic decisions are 
presented as ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ ĂŶĚƚƌƵƐƚǁŽƌƚŚǇ ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ ?ĂŶĚ ƐŽŽŶ ? We certainly need to gain a 
greater view of the inside of the algorithmic systems in which we live, but we also need to 
develop an analysis of the cultural prominence of the notion of the algorithm, what this 
stands for, what it does and what it might reveal.  
 
Admittedly, when I chose the title for this special issue (and for this article) I created myself 
something of a problem. My title suggests that algorithms have or hold some form of power. 
As such, it leads us to try to think about the power that they hold rather than thinking about 
how power might operate through them or be complicit in how those algorithms are 
designed, function and lead to outcomes. Ɛ&ŽƵĐĂƵůƚ  ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ?ŽŶĐĞƉƵƚŝƚ ? ‘ƉŽǁĞƌ ŝƐǁŚĂƚ
ŶĞĞĚƐƚŽďĞĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶďĞŝŶŐƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŽĨĨĞƌƐĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?dŚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵ ŽĨ
conceptualising power in relation to alŐŽƌŝƚŚŵƐŝƐǁŚĂƚ / ?ĚŚŽƉĞĚƚŚŝƐŝƐƐƵĞŵŝŐŚƚĞǆƉůŽƌĞ ?/ƚ
is easy to get caught up in a kind of sci-fi dystopia (or even utopia, depending on your 
perspective) of automated machines and the potent powers of intelligent environments. But 
the relations between power and algorithms require a broad conceptual and methodological  
pallet from which the analysis might be developed. / ?ǀĞďĞĞŶ ĨŽƌƚƵŶĂƚĞ ŝŶƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌƐ 
who have contributed to this issue have managed to skilfully sidestep any problems with the 
title of the issue and have used this as an opportunity to highlight exactly how we might 
rethink any blunt premises that the issue was ǁĂƐďƵŝůƚ ƵƉŽŶ ? / ?Ě ůŝŬĞƚŽ ƚŚĂŶŬ ƚŚĞŵ ĨŽƌ
engaging so carefully, thoughtfully and critically with the remit I set out.  As the articles in this 
collection show, there are many other ways in which we might approach the questions that 
are suggested by thinking and questioning the social power of algorithms. It is at this point 
that I hand over to the articles contained in this collection in order for them to add the detail 
and nuance that is required. The themes I have set up in this introduction echo through the 
pieces, but these articles offer far ŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶ/ ?ŵĂďůĞƚŽĨƵůůy summarise here. 
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